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ABSTRACT
We introduce duration dependent skill decay among the unemployed into a New-
Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed by Blanchard/Gali (2008). If the central
bank responds only to (current, lagged or expected future) inflation and quarterly skill decay is
above a threshold level, determinacy requires a coefficient on inflation smaller than one. The
threshold level is plausible with little steady-state hiring and firing ("Continental European
Calibration") but implausibly high in the opposite case ("American calibration"). Neither
interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap helps to restore determinacy if
skill decay exceeds the threshold level. However, a modest response to unemployment
guarantees determinacy.
Moreover, under indeterminacy, both an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse technology
shock increase unemployment extremely persistently.
JEL Classification: E24, E31, E52, J64.
Keywords: monetary policy rules, Taylor principle, NAIRU, unemployment, hysteresis.
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1 Introduction
The idea that skill loss among the unemployed might generate a relationship between
the actual and the natural unemployment rate is an old one. In fact, Phelps (1972)
himself emphasized this mechanism when developing the concept of the natural rate of
unemployment. In this paper, we introduce skill loss among the unemployed along the
lines of Pissarides (1992) into a New Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed
by Blanchard and Gali (2008). We assume that workers who remain unemployed for
one quarter or longer loose a fraction of their skills per quarter of their unemployment
spell. The share of those unemployed for more than one quarter a¤ects the willingness
of rms to create jobs as rms are matched with di¤erent types of workers according
to their share in the job seeking population. Our goal is to investigate the e¤ects
of introducing skill loss on macroeconomic stability and unemployment persistence
under varying monetary policy rules and degrees of skill loss. As far as we are
aware, this question has not been addressed so far within a state-of-the-art general
equilibrium framework.
Our key results are as follows. Firstly, for su¢ ciently high levels of skill loss, a
nominal interest rate feedback rule with a coe¢ cient on ination exceeding one does
not guarantee determinacy if the quarterly skill loss percentage is large enough. If
the central bank responds only to ination, the coe¢ cient on ination has to be less
than one. This does not depend on whether the central bank responds to current,
expected future, or lagged ination. Secondly, let us denote the level of skill decay
above which determinacy requires the nominal interest rate to respond less than one
for one to ination as the "critical level". We nd that the critical level of skill decay
will be implausibly high if we adopt what Blanchard and Gali deem an "American"
calibration of labour market ows, i.e. a high job nding probability and a high job
destruction rate. By contrast, if we adopt Blanchard and Galis "continental Euro-
pean" calibration, with little hiring and ring, the critical skill loss percentage will
be a lot lower, about 2.5% per quarter. Thirdly, if skill loss is above the critical
level, responding to the output gap (as dened in the New Keynesian literature) in
addition to ination decreases the determinacy region further. Since estimates of
interest feedback rules suggest that the Federal Reserve as well as the Bundesbank
and the ECB respond more than one-for-one to ination and pay some attention to
the output gap as well, our model thus suggests that indeterminacy is far more likely
to happen in Europe than in the United States. Finally, under the continental Euro-
pean calibration, with skill loss above its critical level and the ination coe¢ cient in
the interest feedback rule larger than one, both a one quarter adverse sunspot shock
and a one quarter adverse technology shock have very persistent e¤ects on unemploy-
ment. Thus the model contributes to explaining the highly persistent unemployment
uctuations observed in continental Europe.
Our results can also be compared to an evolving literature on how the determinacy
properties of monetary policy rules change when monetary policy has some indirect
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or direct e¤ect on the supply side. These papers regularly nd that some sort of
restriction on the ination coe¢ cient in the interest feedback rule and/or some re-
sponse to output are necessary to ensure determinacy. For instance, Korozumi and
van Zandweghe (2008) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) nd, in a New Keynesian
model with capital, an interest feedback rule where the interest rate only responds
to expected ination limits the permissible ination responses to an extremely small
range above but very close to one. With such a rule, higher future ination increases
the ex-ante real interest rate and thus the expected future capital rental via the no
arbitrage condition. This in turn increases expected ination. Kurozumi and van
Zandweghe (2008) also show that even a modest response to current output (as op-
posed to the output gap as used in this paper) substantially widens the permissible
range. A response to the lagged interest rate above a certain threshold has a similar
e¤ect. Du¤y and Xiao (2008) qualify their results by showing that in the presence of
capital stock adjustment costs, even a modest response to expected future output is
enough to guarantee determinacy.
Surico (2008) considers a New Keynesian model with a cost-channel along the
lines of Ravenna and Walsh (2006), where the nominal interest rate has a direct
positive e¤ect on ination since rms have to borrow working capital to pay wages.
He shows that, if the interest rate responds to current ination, determinacy requires
an upper bound on the ination coe¢ cient, which, however, is too high to form a
relevant constraint for monetary policy. Tuesta and Llosa (2009) investigate the same
model with a purely forward-looking rule and show that determinacy is unattainable
if the central bank responds only to expected ination.
All of the cited results have in common that the determinacy problem caused by
a monetary policy rule responding to ination alone is never caused by the active
response to ination per se, but to the timing subscript of ination in the interest
feedback rule. By contrast, in the model proposed here, it is the Taylor principle
itself -the idea that an increase in ination should sooner or later cause an increase
in the real interest rate- which creates scope for self-fulllling prophecies if quarterly
skill loss among the unemployed is above the critical level.
The change in the determinacy requirement appears to be caused by a change in
the long-run relationship between marginal cost and unemployment from negative to
positive if skill decay crosses the threshold. Thus if skill decay is above the critical
level, a persistent increase in unemployment will ultimately increase marginal cost
and thus ination. If the central bank responds more than one-for-one to ination,
this would increase the real interest rate, which lowers demand and thus validates the
increase in unemployment: Hence we have a self-fulllling prophecy.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some empirical evidence
for skill loss among the unemployed while section 3 derives the model. Section 4
analyses determinacy in the absence of skill loss, i.e. in the original Blanchard and
Gali (2008) model. Section 5 derives the marginal cost equation in the presence of
skill loss and shows how the e¤ect of unemployment on marginal cost is a¤ected by
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the introduction of skill loss. Section 6 analyses determinacy in the model with skill
loss. Section 7 discusses the response of the model under the European calibration
to an adverse sunspot shock and an averse technology shock. Section 8 concludes.
2 Evidence for Skill Loss
Direct, quantiable evidence for skill loss during unemployment is di¢ cult to obtain.
An idea of the size of skill decay over time can be gained from the literature on wage
loss upon worker displacement. This literature has produced evidence based on panel
regressions showing that the wage upon reemployment depends negatively on the
duration of the unemployment spell. Skill decay during unemployment is usually seen
as one of the factors causing this relationship, although the evolution of reservation
wage due to other factors (for instance depletion of an unemployed persons wealth)
would be expected to have an impact as well. Evidence along these lines include
Addison and Portugal (1989) for American male workers displaced and reemployed
between 1979 and 1984, Pichelmann and Riedel (1993) for Austrian workers between
1972 and 1988, Gregory and Jukes (2001) for British male workers between 1984 and
1994, Gregg and Tominey (2005) for male youths and Gangji and Plasman (2007)
for Belgian workers. Their ndings on the e¤ect of a one-year unemployment spell
on the real wage are -39%, -24%, -11%, -10% and -8% respectively.1 Pichelmann
and Riedel (1993) explicitly ask whether the earnings penalty arising from duration
diminishes during the two years following the unemployment spell and nd that it
does not. Gregg and Tominey (2005) nd that the wage penalty associated with a
year of youth unemployment is still present at age 42.2
Furthermore, Nickell et al. (2001) look at three four year periods from 1982 to
1997. They ask how the earnings loss is changed if the unemployment spell exceeded
6 months and nd an additional permanent earnings loss between 6.8% and 10.6%.3
To which extent these numbers reect skill depreciation depends on the movement of
the reservation wage in general and in particular its responsiveness to the respective
workershuman capital evolution.
There is also evidence suggesting that unemployed workers become less attractive
employees as their unemployment spell lengthens. Jackman et al. (1991) cite various
studies showing that morale and motivation decline the longer a person remains
1For Addison and Portugal (1989), we have calculated the annual earnings penalty using the
lower coe¢ cient on log(duration) in their two preferred specications (Table 3, columns 5 and 6),
p. 294. Duration is measured in weeks. For Pichelmann and Riedel (1993), we had to resort to the
same procedure, see p. 8 in that paper for the results. Their coe¢ cient estimates for the e¤ect on
the real wage is reported in table 2, p. 8. The results of Gregory and Jukes (2001) are reported on
page F619, while the results of Gangji and Plasman (2007) are reported on page 18, table 2.
2See Gregg and Tominey (2005), p. 502 and pp. 505-506.
3See Nickel et al. (2001), p. 17.
4
unemployed.4 The stylised fact that the probability of an unemployed person of
leaving unemployment increases with the unemployment duration (see for instance
Machin and Manning (1999)5) is also seen by some as evidence for skill loss among the
unemployed. It is, however, a priori unclear whether this represents "true" duration
dependence, i.e. the worsening of an individuals employment probability over time,
or merely individual heterogeneity, possibly unobserved. In the later case di¤erent
individuals have di¤erent hazard rates of leaving unemployment as a result of di¤ering
individual characteristics, such as their education. The individuals with higher hazard
rates will leave the unemployment pool quickly, implying that the average hazard
rate of a cohort of unemployed falls as the unemployment spell lengthens. However,
Jackman et al (1991) argue that in the presence of pure individual heterogeneity, and
under certain assumptions about its nature, the ratio of the average hazard rate and
the hazard rate of new entrants into unemployment would have to be constant as the
average hazard rate moves up or down. They nd that for British data, the average
hazard rate declines in fact much more than the hazard rate of new entrants. Van
den Berg and van Ours conrm this result using other "eyeball" tests 6 and a more
formal non-parametric estimation method7. Using the same method, they also nd
negative duration dependence for the United States.8 The model discussed below
does not actually model duration dependence (although it could be extended to do
so). However, overall, we view the evidence above as indicating that workers are less
e¢ cient at work the longer they have been unemployed.
3 The Model
In this section we add skill loss along the lines of Pissarides (1992) to the Blanchard
and Gali (2008) model. We rst go through the optimisation problems of households
and rms and then show what the expressions for marginal cost and the Phillips
Curve look like in the absence and in the presence of skill loss.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of representative and innitely lived house-
holds. A household consists of a continuum of members who supply labour to rms.
They might be employed or unemployed. The household derives income from wage
payments, bond holdings, and rmsprots. It allocates its income to buying a CES
4See Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991), p. 259.
5See Machin and Manning (1999), p. 3100.
6van der Berg and van Ours (1994), p. 23.
7See Van der Berg and van Ours (1994b), p. 442.
8Van der Berg and van Ours (1996), p. 123.
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basket of consumption goods and a riskless bond to maximise
Et
1X
t=0
logCt
where Ct denotes consumption, subject to the budget constraint
NtWt +
Bt 1
Pt
(1 + it 1) + Ft  Ct + Bt
Pt
where Pt; Nt; Wt, Bt, it and Ft denote the price level, hours worked by the members
of the household, the real wage, bonds, the nominal interest rate and the prots of
rms. Consumption is governed by the usual rst order condition
1
Ct
= [1 + it] Et

1
1 + t+1
1
Ct+1

where t denotes the ination rate.
3.2 Firms
There are two types of rms. Final goods rms indexed by i produce a di¤erentiated
product using the intermediate good Xt (i) in the linear technology
Yt (i) = Xt (i)
They produce the varieties in the CES basket of goods consumed by households. The
demand curve for variety i resulting from the household spreading its expenditures
across varieties in a cost minimising way is given by ct(i) = Ct

pt(i)
Pt
 
; where ct(i);
pt(i) and Pt denote consumption and price of variety i and the price level of the
consumption basket, respectively. We will assume that nal goods rms face nominal
rigidities in the form of Calvo contracts, i.e. only a randomly chosen fraction 1   !
of rms can re-optimise its price in a given period. They accordingly maximise
Et
" 1X
i=0
(!)i
Ct
Ct+i
Ct+i
"
pt (j)
Pt+i
1 
 mct+i

pt (j)
Pt+i
 ##
where mct denotes real marginal costs. The price index evolves according to
P 1 t = (1  !) (pt (j))1  + ! (Pt 1)1 
where pt (j) denotes the price set by those rms allowed to reset their price in period
t. Taking rst order approximations to both to the nal goods rst order condition
and the law of motion of the price index and combining the resulting equations yields
the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve relating ination in period t to expected
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t+1 ination and period t marginal costs. The marginal cost of the nal goods rms
equals the real price of the intermediate good, P
I
t
Pt
:
Intermediate goods rms operate under perfect competition and are owned by
households. As is common in the matching literature, we assume that a xed frac-
tion  of jobs is destroyed each period. This can be thought of as an idiosyncratic
productivity shock and implies that even with constant employment, there are con-
stantly ows in and out of employment. Thus employment of rm j evolves according
to
Nt (j) = (1  )Nt 1 (j) +Ht (j)
Where Ht (j) denotes the amount of hiring in rm j. Aggregate hiring is accordingly
given by
Ht = Nt   (1  )Nt 1 (1)
Note that the lower is ; the more Ht will depend on the change as opposed to the
level of employment.
The Intermediate good rms employ labour to produce intermediate goodsXt (j) ;
where j indexes the intermediate good rm. Following Pissarides (1992), we assume
that the productivity of a newly hired worker is the product of exogenous technology
APt and the skill level of worker of type i A
i. Thus the productivity prodit of a worker
of type i is given by
prodit = A
P
t A
i
We follow Pissarides (1992) by making the following assumptions. Ai equals one
if he is short term unemployed, i.e. if he lost his job in period t. Unemployed
workers loose a fraction s of their skills per quarter if they remain unemployed for
one quarter or longer. Skill decay continues for the duration of the unemployment
spell. We assume further, following Pissarides (1992), that the unemployed regain
all their skills after one quarter of employment, that intermediate goods rms meet
workers according to their share among job seekers and that they hire any worker
they meet.9 Finally, when rms decide whether to hire or not they know the state of
exogenous technology APt but not which type of worker they are going to meet with.
We denote the average skill level of the newly hired as ALt :The productivity of a
newly hired worker expected by the rm when deciding whether to hire is denoted
by At and is accordingly given by
At = A
P
t A
L
t (2)
ALt is given by
ALt =
1X
i=0
iss
i
t (3)
9See Pissarides (1992), pp. 1371-1391. In contrast to Pissarides, skill loss does not stop after one
quarter in our model.
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where s = 1  s and sit denotes the share of those unemployed i periods among job
seekers. Note that ALt will be smaller than one if s > 0 and equal to one if s = 0:
We will refer to ALt as the average skill level in period t rather than the expected skill
level to avoid confusion when we refer to EtALt+1:
The shares of the various groups among the number of job seekers, denoted as Ut;
are given by
sit =
Nt 1 i
i

j=1
(1  xt i)
Ut
(4)
where xt denotes labour market tightness, dened as the ratio between aggregate
hiring Ht and Ut, i.e.
xt =
Ht
Ut
(5)
We interpret labour market tightness xt as the probability of an unemployed per-
son to move into employment in period t. For instance, s2t is calculated as follows:
Nt 3 workers loose their jobs in period t-2. A fraction xt 2 moves right back into
employment while a fraction (1  xt 2) remains unemployed and keeps looking for
jobs in period t-1. Of those Nt 3 (1  xt 2) workers, a fraction (1  xt 1) does not
nd a job during t-1 and is still unemployed at the end of that period. Dividing
those Nt 3 (1  xt 2) (1  xt 1) unemployed by Ut then gives the share of those un-
employed for two periods among job seekers in period t.
Ut consists of those who did not nd a job at the end of period t-1 and those
whose jobs were destroyed at the beginning of t:
Ut = 1 Nt 1 + Nt 1 = 1  (1  )Nt 1 (6)
As in the Blanchard Gali model, we assume that the real wage is rigid. We assume
that the wage of a worker depends on his individual productivity in exactly the same
way as in Blanchard Gali (2008): The wageW it of a worker who has been unemployed
for i periods is given by W it = 
0  APt Ait1  ; with 0    1: This means that there
are ve di¤erent wage levels. Accordingly, the real wage the rm expects to pay when
it decides to hire is given by
Wt = 
0
 1X
i=0
i(1 )s s
i
t
! 
APt
1 
(7)
Note that for S = 0; this collapses toWt = 0
 
APt
1 
as in Blanchard Gali. This is
the wage a rm expects to pay when it decides whether to hire. 0 is backed out to
support a desired steady state combination of x;  and n: This is shown in Appendix
II. For future reference, we denote the skill dependent part of the real wage as
WLt =
 1X
i=0
i(1 )s s
i
t
!
(8)
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As in Blanchard and Gali (2008), we assume that every hire generates a cost Gt
which is proportional to the productivity of a newly hired:
Gt = AtB
0xt (9)
where B0 denotes a constant. The intuition behind (9) is that if hiring is high relative
to the number of job seekers, it takes on average longer to ll a vacancy. Since posting
a vacancy is costly, hiring costs increase in xt:10
The intermediate goods rms will hire additional workers until the hiring costs
of an additional worker equal the present discounted value of the prots generated
by this worker. However, unlike in the Blanchard and Gali model, we have to take
account of the skill level of the workforce hired in period t as well as their wage
schedule change in period t+1, as all hired workers who remain employed upgrade to
the full skill level after one quarter. Thus we have
Gt =
P It
Pt
APt A
L
t  Wt + Et
" 1X
i=1
(1  )i iuC (Ct+i)
uC (Ct)

P It+i
Pt+i
APt+i  W 0t+i
#
(10)
where P
I
t
Pt
denotes the real price of intermediate goods while i uC(Ct+i)
uC(Ct)
denotes the
stochastic discount factor of the representative household. The terms P
I
t
Pt
APt A
L
t  Wt
and Et
" 1X
i=1
(1  )i i uC(Ct+i)
uC(Ct)

P It+i
Pt+i
APt+i  W 0t+i
#
represent the ow prot generated
in period t (when the worker has just been hired) and the present discounted value
of prots generated in period t+1 and after, respectively. Note that due to our
assumption that the worker regains all his skills after one period, the expression for
the ow prot in period t is di¤erent from the expression for the ow prot in period
t+1 and after. Rewriting this equation as a di¤erence equation, noting that the real
price of intermediate goods rms equals the marginal cost of nal goods rms (hence
P It
Pt
= mct) and that with log utility,
uC(Ct+i)
uC(Ct)
= Ct
Ct+i
, we have
mctA
P
t A
L
t = Wt +Gt (11)
  (1  )Et

Ct
Ct+1
 
Gt+1 +mct+1A
P
t+1  W 0t+1  
 
mct+1A
P
t+1A
L
t+1  Wt+1

The left hand side represents the real marginal revenue product of labour, which
depends on the period t average skill level among applicants. Clearly, an increase in
the quality of the average period to job seeker ALt will reduce period t marginal cost.
The right hand side features the period t real wage Wt and the period t hiring costs
10Hence (9) can be viewed as a short cut to a model which would specify a matching function and
thus allow to derive the expected time necessary to ll a vacancy and hence the expected cost of
lling a vacancy. See Blanchard and Gali (2008), p. 8.
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Gt, and, with a negative sign, the present expected value of hiring costs saved (Gt+1)
by hiring the worker in t rather than t+1. While an increase in hiring cost today
means increasing production is more costly, an increase in future expected hiring costs
will induce intermediate goods rms to shift hiring into the present, thus lowering
the price of intermediate goods and thus marginal cost.
In addition, the right hand side also includes the present expected value of the t+1
di¤erence between the real prot generated by a fully skilled worker (with productivity
APt+1 and real wage W
0
t+1) and a t+1 newly hired worker (with productivity A
P
t+1A
L
t+1
and real wageWt+1). This represents an additional benet of hiring today rather than
tomorrow not present in the Blanchard Gali model. For further reference note that
this benet decreases in ALt+1 and increases in Wt+1 and mct+1: Thus an expected
higher t+1 skill level will increase marginal cost in period t (since it reduces the
benet from hiring today), while a higher expected average real wage for the t+1
newly hired and a higher expected t+1 price of intermediate goods (i.e. higher t+1
marginal cost) will decrease it.
While At is the relevant level of productivity at the margin, the average produc-
tivity of the whole workforce after adding the newly hired will be di¤erent because
those employees who remained in employment from t-1 to t are all fully skilled. The
average productivity level AAt is then given by
AAt = A
P
t

sNt A
L
t +
 
1  sNt

(12)
where sNt denotes the share of the newly hired in period t employment, which is given
by
sNt =
Ht
Nt
=
Nt   (1  )Nt 1
Nt
(13)
To set up the production function, we have to use AAt Nt for gross output. Hence the
production function becomes
Ct = A
A
t Nt  B0xt APt ALt Ht = AAt Nt  B0xt APt ALt (Nt   (1  )Nt 1) (14)
3.3 Marginal Cost and Phillips Curve the Absence of Skill
Loss
The assumption of hiring costs made by Blanchard and Gali has interesting con-
sequences for the Phillips Curve, which we would like to highlight next. It is well
known that monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing as found in the nal goods
rms lead to, up to rst order, the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve relating
ination to expected future ination and marginal costs (a lower case variable with
a hat denotes the percentage-deviation of this variable from its steady state, unless
otherwise stated):
t = Ett+1 + cmct;  = (1  !) (1  !)
!
(15)
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Concerning marginal cost, in appendix V we show that combining log-linear approx-
imations of equations (11) to (14) combined with log linear approximations to (5) ;
(6) and (1) allows one to express the percentage deviation of marginal cost from its
steady state as
cmct =  aL1baLt + wL1 bwLt + aL2EtbaLt+1   wL2Et bwLt+1   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1 (16)
+h
0
0bnt + h0Lbnt 1 + h0FEtbnt+1   hcEtcmct+1
where
hc =  (1  )
 
1  AL
AL
; g = B0x
h0F =   (1  )

gM

  00X

h
0
0 =

gM

 
1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)+  (1  )01   00X
h0L =  

gM


(1  ) (1  x)   (1  ) 01X
aL1 = 1  gM +  (1  )
AL (1  g)
AA   Ag X
aL2 =  (1  )

1  gM + A
L (1  g)
AA   Ag X

wL1 =
M
AL
W; wL2 =  (1  )
M
AL
W
p0 = 
0 +  (1  )X; p1 =  (1  ) M (
0  W )
AL
X = gM +
1  AL  M (0  W )
AL

0
0 =
AL (1  g (1 + ))
AA   Ag

0
1 =
(1  )  (1 +  (1  x))ALg +  1  AL
AA   ALg
0 = 1  gM   (1  ) M
AL
W
Smaller case variables with hats denote the percentage deviation of a variable from
its steady state and M denotes the steady state mark-up of nal goods rms.
We consider rst the case of no skill loss, i.e. s = 0: In this case we have
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AL = AA = 1; 0 = W and baLt = bwLt : This yieldscmct = h0bnt + hLbnt 1 + hFEtbnt+1   p0bat (17)
h0 =

gM

 
1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)   (1  ) gM (1   0)
hL =  

gM


(1  ) (1  x)   (1  ) gM1
hF =   (1  ) gM



  0

0 =
1  g (1 + )
(1  g)
1 =
g (1  ) (1 +  (1  x))
(1  g)
Hence marginal cost depends positively on current employment but negatively on
lagged employment. An increase in bnt increases labour market tightness and thus
marginal cost, while an increase in bnt 1 reduces the amount of hiring necessary to
achieve a given amount of employment in period t and thus reduces marginal cost.
Marginal cost also depends positively on Etbnt+1; as higher t+1 employment in implies
higher hiring costs in that period, thus increasing the benet of creating jobs today
and correspondingly lowering the price of intermediate goods.
Note that the e¤ect of lagged and lead employment, relative to the e¤ect of cur-
rent employment, increases the less "uid" the labour market is, i.e. the lower the
separation rate  and the steady state job nding rate x for a given level of employ-
ment.11 Assume for instance, for the sake of example, that we have N = 0:9 and,
unrealistically x = 0:9; implying a separation rate of  = 1: In this case, we have
hL = hF = 0: In this scenario, all worker are red at the beginning of the period.
This implies that hiring and hence the cost of hiring depend only on Nt and that the
cost of hiring in the future is irrelevant for job creation today because no job lasts
longer than one period anyway. As we lower the job nding rate and by implication
; the values of hL and hF increase.
Using the relationship bnt = but (1 u) (where but denotes the percentage point, not
the percentage deviation of unemployment from its steady state) and (15) ; we arrive
at the Phillips Curve:
t = Ett+1   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   p0bat (18)
0 =
h0
1  u; L =
 hL
1  u ; F =
 hF
1  u
For future reference, we note that in the Blanchard Gali model we always have
0   L   F > 0:12 This means that a "permanent" increase in unemployment (i.e.
11Note the following steady state cross coe¢ cient restriction between ; x; and N :  = x(1 N)N(1 x) ;
for values of x  N and N < 1:
12This is easily shown: 0   L   F = 1 u (h0 + hL + hF )
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an equal sized increase in but; but 1 and but+1) reduces ination because the e¤ect of
current unemployment dominates the e¤ect of lagged and lead unemployment.
The fact that lead as well as lagged unemployment have positive e¤ects on price
setting, and thus ination through their e¤ect on marginal costs, clearly distinguishes
the Phillips Curve in the Blanchard and Gali model from its counterpart in the
canonical New Keynesian model. The presence of a lagged unemployment term in
the Phillips Curve is commonly associated with (partial) labour market hysteresis.
Here the e¤ect of lagged unemployment works through the e¤ect on price setting.
Jackman et al. (1991) jointly estimate a wage and a price setting equation featuring
both the level and the change in the unemployment rate for 19 OECD countries,
and nd that the change in the unemployment rate has a positive e¤ect on the real
wage employers are willing to pay (given the change in the ination rate and the level
of unemployment) in all countries except for the United States.13 This implies that
lagged unemployment has a negative e¤ect on the real wage employers are willing to
pay and thus boosts ination.
The di¤erence between the United States and other, mostly European OECD
economies concerning the role of lagged unemployment found by Jackman et al., is at
least qualitatively reected by (18) if the "American" and "European" calibrations
of Blanchard and Gali are adopted, respectively. The two parameterisations are
displayed in table 1. The two calibrations di¤er in that in the United States, steady
state unemployment is lower and the labour market is more uid, with a high steady
state job nding probability x of 0.7, which (given u) backs out a high separation rate
of 0.12. In continental Europe, unemployment is higher, with u = 0:1; and there are
less ows in and out of unemployment, with x = 0:25 which backs out a separation
rate  of only 0.04. Furthermore, Blanchard and Gali (2008) set  = 1 since this is
consistent with estimates of matching functions. They set B0 = 0:12, which implies a
fraction of hiring costs in GDP of about one percent under the American calibration
, and correspondingly a lower fraction under the continental European calibration
since x is lower.14 Plugging these parameters into (18), we get
t = 0:99Ett+1   0:083but + 0:02but 1 + 0:056Etbut+1   bat ["American"]
t = 0:99Ett+1   0:143but + 0:063but 1 + 0:079Etbut+1   bat ["Continental European"]
The weight of lagged unemployment relative to the coe¢ cients on current and lead
unemployment is clearly higher under the continental European calibration than un-
der the American one, as found by Jackman et al. The reduction in  and x as we
move from the American to the continental European calibration increases all three
= 1 u
gM


1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)  (1  ) (1  x)   (1  )

> 0: using the fact that that 1 
 = N xN(1 x) , this can be simplied to (1 N)x2+(N   x)N (1  ) > 0: This holds for all permissible
values of x;  and N since the maximum value x can take without violating   1 is N:
13See Jackman et al (1991), pp. 401-408.
14See Blanchard and Gali (2008), p.27.
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coe¢ cients but the proportional increase is clearly the biggest for lagged unemploy-
ment.15
Parameter "American" "Continental European"
 0.99 0.99
 0.08 0.08
 6 6
M 1.2 1.2
 1 1
x 0.7 0.25
u 0.05 0.1
 0.12 0.04
B0 0.12 0.12
g 0.084 0.03
Table 1: Calibration
4 Determinacy in the Blanchard and Gali Model
We now explore under what conditions the Taylor principle ensures determinacy in
the Blanchard Gali model. For that purpose, we rst write our model as a system
in t; but;bct;bit and bat and close it by adding an interest feedback rule. The full model
consists of
t = Ett+1   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   p0bat (19)bct = bat   c0but   c1but 1; c0 = 0
1  u; c1 =
1
1  ubct = Etbct+1   bit   Ett+1bat = abat 1 + et; et i:i:d:   0; 2bit = t + ubut;   0; u  0
The second equation is a log-linear approximation to equation (14) in the absence
of skill loss. These equations can be reduced to system of three rst order di¤erence
equations with variables t; but and an auxiliary variable buLt = but 1 and the forcing
15This is due to the fact that the absolute value of the coe¢ cient on bnt 1 in the equation relatingbxt to bnt 1 and bnt equals (1 )(1 x) : The coe¢ cient on bnt; which equals the coe¢ cient on bnt+1 inbxt+1; depends only on 1=: Once we substitute out bxt and bxt+1 in the marginal cost equation, this
is multiplied with (1  ) as the e¤ect of future expected hiring costs depends on the likelihood that
a job survives. Thus as  and x both decrease, we will see a bigger increase of the coe¢ cient on
lagged employment (lagged unemployment) than on lead employment (lead unemployment).
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process bat : 0@ Ett+1Etbut+1buLt+1
1A = A
0@ tbutbuLt
1A+ bbat (20)
where A is a 3x3 coe¢ cient matrix and b is a 3x1 coe¢ cient vector. This system has
one predetermined endogenous variable, buLt , and two endogenous jump variables, t
and but: To check for determinacy, we can thus apply proposition C.2 from Woodford
(2003) to matrix A.16 This is done in the appendix. The result is summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Consider the system described by (19) equilibrium is determinate if
and only if  u (1 )0 L F > 1 and a set of other conditions discussed in the appendix
are met, which however hold under reasonable restrictions on the parameters. Proof:
Appendix I
The interpretation of this condition is analogous to the one derived in Woodford
(2003) for the canonical New Keynesian model, since it also says that in the long run,
a one-percentage-point increase in ination should trigger an increase in the nominal
interest rate of more than one.17 If ination increases permanently by one percentage
point, this will increase the nominal interest rate directly by  and indirectly through
the reduction in unemployment, which amounts to (1 )
0 L F , times the coe¢ cient on
unemployment in the interest feedback rule, u (which is restricted to be negative).
Hence it su¢ ces for determinacy to set  > 1:
5 Marginal Cost and Phillips Curve in the Pres-
ence of Skill Loss
The main di¤erence between (16) and (17) is the presence of the  aL1baLt +aL2EtbaLt+1+
wL1 bwLt  wL2Et bwLt+1 term, the  p1EtbaPt+1 term and the  hcEtcmct+1 term. The intuition
for the impact of these on marginal costs was already provided in section 3.2. In this
section we will express both the period t skill level of the average job seeker and the
skill dependent real wage as a function of past employment alone. We also characterise
the implied relationship between marginal cost and unemployment, and how the long
run relationship between marginal cost and unemployment is shaped by the skill loss
percentage s and the job nding probability x:
To fully determine marginal cost, we will express both the skill level and the
skill dependent component of the real wage as a function of past employment. In
appendix III we show after linearising (3), (4) and (6), (5) ; and (1), we can express
16See Woodford (2003), p.672-673.
17Woodford (2003), p. 254.
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the percentage deviation of the average skill level from its steady state baLt as weighted
innite sum of past employment rates
baLt = 1X
i=1
ani bnt i; ani = 1u (1  x)i  i 1s   is (21)
and analogously for bwLt (using (8) instead of (3))
bwLt = 1X
i=1
wni bnt i; wni = 1u (1  x)i (1 )(i 1)s   (1 )is  (22)
For both equations, the coe¢ cients on past employment ani and w
n
i are zero for
s = 0 and larger than zero for s > 0: Higher past employment means that the
unemployment spell of the average job seeker will be shorter. This increases the
average skill level and by implication also increases his real wage.
Furthermore, both ani and w
n
i decrease in the steady state job nding probability
x. If people move quickly out of unemployment, the e¤ect of t-i employment on
the average skill level in period t is lower since the additional worker employed in
period t-i had a high probability to nd a job in period t-i+1 or after that anyway.
Analogously, the e¤ect of employment on the skill-dependent part of the real wage
declines as well.
For the marginal cost of rms, what matters is not merely the direction of the
e¤ects of past employment on labour productivity and the real wage of the newly
hired, but also their relative magnitude. We would also like to know how the latter
depends on s and x. Furthermore, what matters for our reasoning below will be the
derivatives of the joint e¤ects of past employment on the skill level and the real wage
rather than the derivatives of the individual ani coe¢ cients. They are summarised by
the following proposition. 18
Proposition 2 Let an =
1P
i=1
ani and w
n =
1P
i=1
wni :Then a
n = 1 x
u
1 s
1 (1 x)s , w
n =
1 x
u
1 1 s
1 (1 x)1 s and a
n > wn if and only if  > 0 and s < 1: Furthermore,
@an
@s
=
1 x
u
x
(1 (1 x)s)2
> 0 and @w
n
@s
= 1 x
u
(1  ) x s
(1 (1 x)1 s )2
> 0. @a
n
@s
> @w
n
@s
if s is close
to 1 and  > 0: Furthermore, @a
n
@x
=   1
u
1 s
(1 (1 x)s)2
< 0 and @w
n
@x
=   1
u
1 1 s
(1 (1 x)1 s )2
<
0. Finally, @a
n
@x
> @w
n
@x
if and only if s is close to one and  is su¢ ciently large. Proof:
Appendix IV.
This proposition says that for positive skill loss and real wage rigidity, the joint
e¤ect of past employment levels on the quality of the average job seeker will always
18As we show in appendix III, for s > 0, the relative magnitude of the ani and w
n
i coe¢ cients
and in the case of @a
n
i
@s
and @w
n
i
@s
also the sign will depend on i.
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dominate the joint e¤ect of past employment levels on the real wage. Furthermore, an
increase in the quarterly skill-loss percentage will increase both the joint e¤ect of past
employment on the quality of the average job seeker and the real wage. However, if
skill loss is small and there is real-wage rigidity, an increase in the quarterly skill-loss
percentage will have a larger impact on the joint e¤ect of past employment on the
average skill level than on the e¤ect of employment on the real wage.
Under qualitatively the same conditions, an increase in the job nding probability
will reduce the joint e¤ect of past employment on the quality of the average job seeker
by more than the e¤ect of past employment on the average real wage. These condi-
tions are easily fullled for reasonable calibrations and in any case for the calibrations
we will employ below.
The above implies that in the presence of real wage rigidity ( > 0)
 with positive skill loss (s > 0) a "permanent" increase in unemployment (de-
crease in employment) increases the ratio between the (average) wage of the
newly hired and their average productivity, while a decline in unemployment
(an increase in employment) decreases this ratio. More formally, for a given
increase in unemployment baL <  bwL
 the size of the increase of the ratio between productivity and the real wage
increases in s: Hence if s is higher,  bwL  baL will be higher as well.
 the size of the increase in the gap between productivity and the real wage
decreases in x. Hence if x is higher,  bwL  baL will be smaller.
We now turn to the meaning of all this for the relationship between unemployment
and marginal cost. Note that aL1 > a
L
2 and w
L
1 > w
L
2 if ;  > 0; as will be the case for
reasonable calibrations. Hence we can obtain from (16) that a permanent increase in
the average skill level will lower marginal cost and an increase in the (skill dependent
component of) the real wage will increase it. This is because the gain from hiring
today rather than tomorrow originating from the skill appreciation is uncertain and
is being discounted. The same is true for the e¤ect of the factors a¤ecting this gain
on marginal cost.
Furthermore, as can be obtained from their denitions, aL1   aL2 and wL1  wL2 will
be quite close for sensible calibrations. We have seen that if unemployment increases
permanently, both baLt and baLt+1 decline by a larger amount than bwLt and bwLt+1 if  > 0:
This means that unemployment increases marginal cost via this channel, the more so
higher the degree of skill loss s: Thus we would expect an increase in s to make the
link between unemployment and marginal cost less negative.
We now turn to characterize the e¤ect of unemployment on marginal costs and
how this e¤ect depends on s more rigorously. First, we quasi-di¤erence (21) and
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(22), which yields
baLt = (1  x)1u (1  s) bnt 1 + sbaLt 1

bwLt = (1  x)1u  1  1 s  bnt 1 + 1 s bwLt 1

Substituting these equations into (16) and using bnt =  but1 u yields
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1 (23)
 hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPtbaLt = (1  x)  (1  s) but 1u (1  u) + sbaLt 1

bwLt = (1  x)   1  1 s  but 1u (1  u) + 1 s bwLt 1

a = 
 
aL1   aL2 (1  x) s

w = 
 
wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s

0 = 

h
0
0 + (1  x)

aL2
(1 s)
u
  wL2 (
1 1 s )
u

1  u
L =
 h0L
1  u ; 

F =
 h0F
1  u
Setting cmct+1 = cmct = cmc; but+1 = but = but 1 = bu, baLt = baLt 1 = baL and bwLt =bwLt 1 = bwL and ignoring exogenous technology, we can write
cmc =  

0   F   L1   a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s) + w
 (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )

1 + hc
bu
=  bu (24)
 =
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F  

(1 x)
u
(1 s)(aL1 aL2 )
(1 (1 x)s)  
(1 x)
u
(1 1 s )(wL1  wL2 )
(1 (1 x)1 s )

(1 + hc) (1  u) 
  gives the e¤ect of a "permanent" increase in unemployment on marginal cost.
Most conveniently, substituting the denitions of h
0
0; h
0
L and h
0
F yields
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F =
gM


1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)  (1  ) (1  x)   (1  )
which happens to be exactly the same as h0 + hL + hF ; is thus always positive and
independent of s:Hence in  only the term in the squared brackets and hc actually
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depend on skill loss. The squared bracket will be zero if there is no skill loss (s =
1), implying that  > 0 and thus a negative e¤ect of a "permanent" increase in
unemployment on marginal cost.
With positive skill loss, the squared bracket represents the "skill loss channel"
from unemployment to marginal cost. The rst term gives the decline of the skill
level of the average applicant caused by the decline in bn associated with the increase
in bu (note that (1 x)
u
(1 s)
(1 (1 x)s) = a
n) times the net e¤ect of a permanent skill level
decline on marginal cost (
 
aL1   aL2

). The second term gives the decline of the skill-
dependent real wage caused by the decline in bn associated with the increase in bu
(Note that (1 x)
u
(1 1 s )
(1 (1 x)1 s )
= wn) times the net e¤ect of a permanent skill decline
in the skill dependent real wage on marginal cost (-
 
wL1   wL2

).
As s grows, we would expect the squared bracket to grow as well if the real wage
is rigid. As was pointed out above, an increase in s means that the gap between
productivity and the real wage shrinks at a faster rate as unemployment increases.
This would lower . To check our intuition, we take the derivative of  with respect
to s and arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let  be as in (24) and let s close to zero. Then @@s < 0 if  >
B0xM(1 )
1 B0xM(1 (1 )) : Proof: Appendix VI.
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Accepting the restriction on s; the condition for @@s < 0 is easily fullled for
the calibrations adopted in this paper since B0xM (1  ) is a small number, while
1 B0xM (1   (1  )) is very close to one.20
Thus an increase in s indeed makes the e¤ect of unemployment on marginal costs
less negative. This raises the possibility of  turning negative as s increases. To put
it di¤erently, an increase in unemployment would then cause an increase rather than
a decrease in marginal cost, and, by implication, ination. This has consequences for
the determinacy properties of the interest feedback rule of the central bank which we
will come back to in the following section.
19A more general proof without restrictions on s would have been desirable but struck us as
impossible due to the complexity of the expression resulting from @@s :
20One might wonder why the condition in the proposition does not simply say  > 0. For better
understanding, not rst that this is merely a su¢ cient not a necessary and su¢ cient condition.
As can be obtained from appendix VI, the necessary and su¢ cient value of  would be lower.
Furthermore, it can obtained from (11) that even if there is no real wage rigidity and thus Wt would
move by the same percentage as ALt the e¤ects of a decline or increase in the average skill level would
not be neutral. This is because the t+1 ow prot associated with hiring in t mct+1APt+1  W 0t+1
does not depend on the skill level of the average applicant. Thus a permanent decline in ALt a¤ect
mct in some way even if there is no real wage rigidity. The resulting e¤ect can be obtained from
(24) by setting  = 0 in the squared bracket:
  
aL1   aL2
   wL1   wL2  (1 x)u (1 s)(1 (1 x)s) :
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We are also interested in how a change in x for a given unemployment rate will
a¤ect  and @
@s
: It is easy to show that in the absence of skill loss, @
@x
> 0. Hence
in the absence of skill loss, the e¤ect of a permanent increase in unemployment on
marginal cost will be more negative. This is due to the reasons discussed earlier.
Introducing skill loss adds two opposing forces of a change in x on both  and @
@s
:
On the one hand, as was shown above, an increase in x will lower in absolute value the
negative e¤ect of past unemployment on the skill level an and, to a lesser extent, the
e¤ect of past unemployment on the real wage wn. On the other hand, an increase in x
given u will increase , implying that the gain associated with the skill appreciation of
a worker hired today becomes more uncertain. This is reected in the fact that both
aL2 and w
L
2 decrease as  increases, thus reducing the e¤ect of the baLt+1 and bwLt+1terms
in (16) : Concerning the e¤ect on of a change of x on @
@s
; we are able to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 Let  be as in (24), s close to zero and  close to 1. Then @
2
@s@x
> 0
if x < 4 u 
p
u2+8u
4
Proof: Appendix VI21
This condition holds a for a wide range of reasonable calibrations of x and u;
including those considered in this paper. Hence an increase in the job nding proba-
bility x reduces the e¤ect of s on : To put it di¤erently, if the job nding probability
is higher, increasing s will still weaken the (negative) link between marginal cost and
employment, but to a lesser extent than in a less uid labour market.
The model developed above features multiple links between unemployment and
marginal costs. To sum up what we have learned, a permanent increase in unemploy-
ment has the following four e¤ects on marginal cost in period t:
1. The increase in period unemployment lowers period t hiring costs (-h
0
0= (1  u)),
which tends to lower marginal cost. The strength of this channel increases in
the job nding probability x.
2. The increase in period t+1 unemployment lowers period t+1 hiring cost, which
tends to increase marginal cost ( h0F= (1  u)). The strength of this channel
decreases in x.
3. An increase in period t-1 unemployment increases period t hiring costs by in-
creasing the amount of hiring necessary to reach a given level of employment
(h
0
L= (1  u)). The strength of this channel decreases in x.
21Again this is a su¢ cient condition not a necessary and su¢ cient one, which can be obtained
from appendix VI. For instance, the condition reported has  set equal to zero. In fact the maximum
value of x increases in :
20
4. An increase in period t to t 1 unemployment increases baLt   bwLt and baLt+1  bwLt+1. The net e¤ect of this is to increase marginal cost. ( (1 x)u(1 u) (1 s)(aL1 aL2 )(1 (1 x)s)  
(1 x)
u(1 u)
(1 1 s )(wL1  wL2 )
(1 (1 x)1 s )(1 u)
> 0 if s > 0): The strength of this channel increases in
the skill loss percentage s and decreases in x.
Note that e¤ects 1-3 are already present in the model without skill loss, while the
fourth e¤ect arises from the introduction of skill loss among the unemployed.
6 Determinacy in the Model with Skill Loss
We now investigate which policy rules guarantee determinacy in the presence of skill
loss. The rst question we are interested in is whether  > 1 is still a su¢ cient
condition to establish determinacy for varying levels of skill loss. Thus we consider
current, forward and backward looking rules where the interest rate responds only to
ination. We are dealing with the following system:
t = Ett+1 + cmct (M1)
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1 (M2)
 hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPtbaLt = (1  x)  (1  s) but 1u (1  u) + sbaLt 1

(M3)
bwLt = (1  x)   1  1 s  but 1u (1  u) + 1 s bwLt 1

(M4)
bct = baPt + cLbaLt   c0but   c1but 1 (M5)
cL =
AL (1  g)
AA   ALg ; c

0 =

0
0
1  u; c

1 =

0
1
1  ubct = Etbct+1   bit   Ett+1 (M6)baPt = abaPt 1 + et; et i:i:d:   0; 2 (M7)bit = Ett+j;   0;   1  j  1 (M8)
(M5) is derived in Appendix V. Unfortunately, unlike in the original Blanchard/
Gali model, we cannot establish the conditions for determinacy analytically. There-
fore we solve the model numerically using the software Dynare and perform a grid
search for values of s between 0 and 0.07 (step size: 0.005) and values of  be-
tween 0 and 3 (step size: 0.1). All other parameters are set to meet Blanchard and
Galis "Continental European" calibration as reproduced in table 1. We then repeat
21
the grid search for the "American" calibration.22 The determinacy regions for the
current looking rule are graphed in gures 1 and 2. The area between the two lines
denotes the determinacy region in both graphs (including the points situated on these
lines). For the European calibration, for values of s  0:025; the standard require-
ment on  to guarantee determinacy is reversed: A unique equilibrium now requires
  0:9: The determinacy regions for the backward and forward looking rules (not
shown) are almost identical. In particular, under the Continental European calibra-
tion, the drop of the maximum value of  to 0:9 for s  0:025 carries over. This
suggests that it is not the timing of the active response to ination but the active
response to ination per se which induces indeterminacy.
By contrast, for the American calibration,  > 1 does guarantee determinacy for
the whole range considered here. The determinacy regions for the current, forward
and backward looking policy rule are completely identical. Experimentation suggest
that for the current looking rule, the   0:9 requirement only becomes relevant at
s  0:225:
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Figure 1: Continental European Calibration: Determinacy Region
22Note that the following results discussed below also hold if we use the same lower unemployment
rate under the American calibration as under the European calibration. For a given job nding
probability, this implies a lower job destruction rate.
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Figure 2: US Calibration: Determinacy Region
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The intuition for this result can be gained by showing how the e¤ect of a "per-
manent" increase in unemployment on marginal costs depends on s: As can be seen
from (24) ; in the absence of skill loss this e¤ect is negative since h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F > 0:
However, as we have shown in the previous section, @
@s
< 0. Thus as we increase s;
 will ultimately turn negative. Figure 3 plots  against s for both the European
(broken line) and the American (solid line) calibration. Note that under the con-
tinental European calibration, the level of skill loss for which this expression turns
negative is the same for which the determinacy requirement switches to   0:9, i.e.
0.025. Thus if marginal costs, and thus ination, increases in response to a persistent
increase in the unemployment rate, the central bank should lower the real interest
rate. This policy lowers the real interest rate, hence increases demand therefore does
not validate the increase in unemployment. By contrast, with   1; there is scope
for sunspot equilibria if s exceeds its respective critical value: An upward jump in
unemployment will ultimately lead to an increase in ination and (as   1) the real
interest rate, which lowers demand and thus validates the increase in unemployment.
In the next section, when we display the impulse response function to a sunspot
shock, we show that this is in fact exactly what happens.
This leaves the question why this critical value is so much higher for the American
than for the continental European calibration. The chief reason for this is that due
to the more uid labour market associated with the American calibration, for s = 0;
 is a lot higher than under the continental European calibration: The intuition
for that was discussed above. Furthermore, we have shown in the previous section
that if x is higher, the e¤ect of s on  will be less ( @
2
@s@x
> 0) Therefore under the
American calibration,  decreases a little less as s increases than under the European
calibration.
We now check whether interest rate smoothing would help to restore determinacy.
Therefore we replace M8 bybit = (1  i)t+ibit 1 and perform a grid search over
, i and s; with  = [0; 3] ; i = [0; 1] and s = [0; 0:07] : The determinacy
requirement on  remains almost una¤ected.
23 In particular, determinacy requires
  0:9 if s  0:025 independently of the degree of interest rate smoothing. This
result is in line with the intuition given above as even with interest rate smoothing,
if  > 1; an increase in ination ultimately increases the real interest rate.
We investigate next whether responding to the output gap in addition to ination
helps to restore determinacy under the European calibration. As is standard in the
New Keynesian literature, we dene potential output Y nt as the output level including
hiring costs at which nal goods rms charge their desired mark-up, implying that
marginal cost is at its steady state. The associated unemployment rate is denoted as
unt : As marginal cost is a¤ected by both lead unemployment and lead marginal cost,
when deriving unt ; we will further assume that if unemployment is at its natural level
23Only for  = 0:8 and  = 0:9 does smoothing make a di¤erence in that for s = 0:02; the
maximum value for  increases to 2.3 and 2.5, respectively. For 
s  0:025; the maximum value of
 th drops to 0.9, as for all other degrees of smoothing.
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in period t, it will be expected to be at its natural level in period t+1 as well.24 Thus
we are dealing with the following system:
24The following results are broadly robust against relaxing this assumption.
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t = Ett+1 + cmct
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPtbaLt = (1  x)  (1  s) but 1u (1  u) + sbaLt 1

bwLt = (1  x)   1  1 s  but 1u (1  u) + 1 s bwLt 1

bct = baPt + cLbaPt   c0but   c1but 1; cL = AL (1  g)AA   ALg ; c0 = 
0
0
1  u; c

1 =

0
1
1  ubct = Etbct+1   bit   Ett+1baPt = abaPt 1 + et; et i:i:d:   0; 2
bunt = FEtbunt+1 + Lbut 1 + abaLt + w bwLt   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+10
byt = baPt + yLbaLt   y0but   y1but 1; yL = ALAA ; y0 = ALAA (1  u) ; y1 =
 
1  AL (1  )
AA (1  u)bynt = baPt + yLbaLt   y0bunt   y1but 1bit = t + y (byt   bynt ) ; ; y  0
The equation for bunt was derived by setting cmct = cmct+1 = 0 and but+1 = bunt+1 in
the marginal cost equation, while the equation describing the deviation of output
including hiring costs from its steady state is derived in appendix V. Clearly bunt
depends on past values of actual unemployment as well as its own future value.
We perform a grid search over ; y and s; with  = [0; 3] ; y = [0; 3] (step
size 0.1) and s = [0; 0:07] : We nd that responding to the output gap extends the
determinacy region if s < 0:025 but reduces it if s  0:025: For example, gure
4 plots the lowest value of  compatible with determinacy against y for s = 0:
Clearly the lower bound of  declines as y increases. By contrast, gure 5 plots
the highest value of  compatible with determinacy for the case of s = 0:025: The
upper bound of  is declining, thus reducing the determinacy region.
Intuition for this result can be gained from the e¤ect of actual unemployment on
natural unemployment. It is easy to see that byt   bynt =  y0 (but   bunt ). Hence the
output gap depends positively on bunt : Solving bunt forward (ignoring the exogenous
productivity process) yields bunt = 1P
i=0

F
0
i 
Lbut 1 + abaLt   w bwLt  : Let us again
assume for simplicity that but+i = bu: We then have
bun = L + a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s)   w (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )
0   F
bu
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Figure 4: Continental Europe, s = 0; lower Bound of the Determinacy Region
If @bun
@bu < 1; then an increase in unemployment increases natural unemployment less
than one for one. It thus lowers the output gap and tends to lower real interest rate.
This should stabilise unemployment. By contrast, if @bun
@bu > 1; an increase in unemploy-
ment will increase bun more than one for one and thus tend to increase the real interest
rate. In this case responding to the output gap is actually destabilising. Moreover,
note that @bun
@bu > 1 , 0   F   L   a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s) + w (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )
< 0;
implying that  < 0: As was shown above, this will be true if s  0:025: Hence
responding to the output gap will tend to destabilise the economy precisely when
responding more than one for one to ination tends to destabilise the economy as
well.
If natural output tracks actual output too closely for the output gap to be a
stabilising argument in the policy rule, then perhaps the deviation of unemployment
from its steady state (rather than its natural) value will help to achieve determinacy.
Thus we consider the policy rule bit = t + ubut and conduct a grid search over
s;  and u, with  = [0; 3] ; u = [0;   3] (step size 0.1) and s = [0; 0:07] : It
turns out that responding to unemployment has a strong stabilising e¤ect. Setting
u =  0:1 guarantees determinacy for   0:2 if s  0:02 and for the full interval
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Figure 5: Continental Europe, s = 0:025; upper Bound of the Determinacy Region
of  for 0 < s  0:035. For higher values of s the upper bound of  again
begins to decline. For u =  0:2; determinacy is guaranteed for the full interval of
 as long as s  0:055: Finally, for u   0:3; the equilibrium is determinate for
any combination of  and s: Thus a modest response to unemployment restores
determinacy and in doing so is robust against variations in s:
Let us assume that our model in its respective calibrations of u; x, and  indeed
captures major di¤erences between the continental European and the US economy.
Furthermore, note that the value of s for which the value of  begins to be bounded
above under the American Calibration seems implausibly high. With s = 0:225; a
worker would have lost about 64% after one year of unemployment. By contrast, the
critical value of s for the continental European calibration seems a lot more plausible.
It would imply a skill loss of about 9.6% after one year of unemployment. Note also
that estimates of interest feedback rules suggest that the Federal Reserve as well as
the Bundesbank and the ECB respond more than one for one to ination and pay
some attention to the output gap as well.25 Hence we conclude that indeterminacy is
25See for instance Clarida et al. (1998), Orphanides (2001) and Clausen and Meier (2003) for
reaction function estimates for the Fed and the Bundesbank and Gorter et al. (2008) and Sauer and
Sturm (2003) for estimates for the ECB.
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far more likely to happen in Europe than in the United States.
Moreover, in the 1970s many central banks moved away from a "Keynesian" mon-
etary policy which focuses on stabilising unemployment to a policy which aggressively
targets ination but pays little attention to unemployment. Within the model pro-
posed here, with s  0:025; this move would cause no determinacy problem with a
uid American labour market but would induce indeterminacy if labour market ows
were low as in continental Europe. In the next section we will investigate the dynam-
ics of unemployment and ination for the European calibration with s  0:025 and
 > 1:
7 Dynamics under Indeterminacy
The previous section showed that a policy rule which increases the nominal interest
rate more than one for one with ination might quite likely imply indeterminacy if the
ow - characteristics of the labour market are "continental European" in the sense
that there is little hiring and ring and there is some skill loss among the unemployed.
Since there is an innite number of stable equilibria, self-fulllling prophecies can gen-
erate endogenous uctuations of unemployment and other endogenous variables. In
this section we investigate the response of the model under the continental European
calibration and with skill loss being at the critical level of 0.025 to a sunspot shock
and a non-correlated technology shock.
To solve the indeterminate model, we follow a solution method proposed by Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003). Their method builds on an approach by Sims (2000). Sims
proposed to solve linear rational expectation (RE) models by solving for the vector
of expectational errors t = qt   Et 1qt, where qt is a vector of variables over which
agents form expectations. Thus the linear RE model is cast in the following form
 0yt =  1yt 1 +	"t +t (25)
where "t denotes an i.i.d vector of structural shocks and all variables with a t and
t-1 subscript are observable at time t, and all variables with a t-1 subscript are
predetermined. Any system of rst order di¤erence equations can be brought into
this form by replacingEtqt+1 with yt = Etqt+1 and the adding an equation reading qt =
yt 1 + t: Thus there will be an expectation error for each forward-looking variable.
Note that all variables on the right hand side except for t are either predetermined
or exogenous
The system has a stable solution if there exists a vector t as a function of the
exogenous shocks "t to eliminate the explosive components of yt. The solution is a
unique solution if the vector of structural shocks "t uniquely determines the vector of
expectational errors t. The solution will not be unique if the number of expectation
errors exceeds the number of explosive components in yt:26 This opens the door for
26See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), pp. 276-277.
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Figure 6: European Calibration, -2% Consumption Belief Shock - but and bct
sunspot shocks to a¤ect the endogenous variables. Lubik and Schorfheide suggest
to interpret these shocks as belief shocks that trigger reversion of forecasts of the
endogenous variable. Suppose that due to a sunspot the expectation of qt between t
and t-1 is revised by vt: Hence
qt = (Et 1qt + vt) + et
where the term in brackets denotes the revised forecast and et is the error associated
with this revised forecast.27 Thus (25) can be written as
 0yt =  1yt 1 +

	 
  "t
vt

+et (26)
If the solution is unique, vt will not appear in the solution.
We then assume that the e¤ects of the sunspot shock vt and the structural shock
"t to the forecast error are orthogonal to each other. This is a standard assumption
in the literature on indeterminate linear rational expectations models. It means we
are restricting our attention to a subset of the set of solutions of the indeterminate
27See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), p. 279.
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model. This solution can be picked up easily by castingM1 toM8 in the form of (27).
We thus have yt =
h
xt x
u
t x
mc
t x
n
t x
c
t baPt t but cmc0t bunt bct baLt bwLt bit i0,
"t = et and vt =

et v

t v
u
t v
mc
t v
n
t v
c
t
0
with xqt = Etqt+1, the v
q
t denoting the
belief shock associated with the forecast of the t+1 value of variable q and cmc0t = mct:
The matrices  0,  1; 	 and  are to be found in appendix VII.
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Figure 7: European Calibration, -2% Consumption Belief Shock - Ination and cmct
Note that the way the model is written, we have ve belief shocks - one for each
forward looking variable. However, the e¤ects of those shocks on the forecast errors,
and thus on the endogenous variables, will not generally be independent from each
other. For instance, if there is one stable root too many, as is the case under the
calibration we are dealing with, there is one degree of freedom. That means we
can choose the value of one endogenous variable and then the stable solution for
the remaining ones will be pinned down as well. For instance, it will be possible to
reproduce the dynamics produced by vt with a suitable value of v
u
t ; v
mc
t ; v
n
t or v
c
t :
We assume that the central bank responds only to ination and set  = 1:5:
When looking at the impulse response of the technology shock, we set a = 0:
We rst consider the e¤ects of a -2% belief shock to consumption, i.e. vc0 =  0:02:
Figure 6 displays the deviation of unemployment from its steady state (in percentage
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Figure 8: Skill Decline following a Permanent Unemployment Increase - Percentage
of Total Drop
points) and output net of hiring costs (in percent), i.e. consumption. Unemployment
increases by about 0.9 percentage point, while consumption declines by a bit less
than 0.9% and then declines somewhat further. The increase in unemployment is
very persistent: after 10 years, unemployment is still about 0.72 percentage points
above its steady state while after 25 years (100 quarters) it still exceeds its steady
state by 0.51%.
Figure 7 shows that cmct falls by 0.06% on impact and then starts increasing
and turns positive in quarter 13. Since we have choosen a value of s such that 
is smaller than zero (see Figure 3, the "Continental Europe" line), we would expect
the persistent increase in unemployment to ultimately turn marginal cost positive.
However, as long as the history of high unemployment is short, the skill loss among
job seekers has not yet su¢ ciently built up to turn marginal cost positive. In terms
of the four e¤ects of an increase in unemployment on marginal cost listed at the end
of section ve, e¤ect number four has not yet gained enough momentum such that
the joint positive impact of e¤ects 2, 3 and 4 dominate the negative impact of e¤ect
1. To illustrate how the dynamic of the skill decline matches with sign change and
dynamic of cmct, consider how the skill level evolves in response to a "permanent"
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Figure 9: European Calibration, Consumption Belief Shock: Ex-ante Real Interest
Rate
change in the unemployment rate:
baLt = an  (1  x)t ts   1 bu(1  u)
where an is the e¤ect of a permanent increase in employment on the skill level of
the average applicant and can be obtained from proposition 2. Note that for t !
1; as (1  x)t ts ! 0; this expression gives the e¤ect of a permanent increases
in unemployment on the skill level. In Figure 8, we plot baLt (as dened in this
equation) as a percentage of the change of baL1 after an innite number of periods, i.e. 
1  (1  x)t ts
 100: The curve is rather steep at the beginning but then attens
out. With an unemployment history of twelve quarters, which happens to be the
case in quarter 13, the decline in baLt has reached 97.7% of its total and the rate of
change has decreased to about 0.5 percentage points. Thus cmct turns positive after
the decline in the skill level resulting from the increase in unemployment has almost
reached its maximum. Note also that the dynamics of cmct and baLt are similar in
that the rate of increase of cmct is at its highest during those rst 13 quarters but
then gradually declines.
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Figure 10: European Calibration, -2% Technology Shock
Ination declines to -0.08% on impact but turns positive in quarter four. It then
keeps rising until it reaches a maximum of 0.01% in quarter 17. Ination is pushed
faster above zero because it responds not just to current but also to expected future
values of marginal costs. Correspondingly, we would expect the ex ante real interest
rate to ultimately increase as well. Figure 9 shows that (it   Ett+1) declines on
impact but begins to increase in quarter two and begins to exceed its steady state
value in quarter 5 and then remains persistently above it. The persistent increase in
the real interest rate validates the initial decline in consumption and the associated
increase in unemployment.
We now turn to the e¤ects of a non-correlated technology shock of -2%, i.e. e0 =
 0:02: Figure 10 shows that unemployment and consumption both decline by about
1%, but in quarter 2 unemployment increases to about 0.65 percentage points above
its steady state value. Unemployment and consumption then display a similar degree
of persistence as in response to a consumption belief shock. Figure ?? shows that
ination and cmct both increase on impact. Both turn negative in the next period
due to the increase in unemployment. cmct turns positive in quarter 15 due to the
fact that unemployment persistently increases, while ination again turns positive
faster. This then ultimately implies an above-steady-state real-interest rate.
34
-0.15%
-0.10%
-0.05%
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.25%
0.30%
0 20 40 60 80 100
Quarter
Inflation
lambda*mchat
Figure 11: European Calibration, -2% Technology Shock - Ination and cmct
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Thus both shocks can potentially trigger extremely persistent increases in unem-
ployment under the continental European calibration if skill loss exceeds its critical
level and the central bank reacts more than one-for-one to ination. This is clearly a
very interesting result given the persistent increase in unemployment in manyWestern
European countries since the end of the 1970s.
8 Conclusion
This paper adds skill loss among the unemployed as an additional labour-market
friction to the model of Blanchard and Gali (2008) and shows the implications of
this modication for determinacy. We assume that an unemployed person loses a set
fraction of her skills during every quarter of her unemployment spell but regains all
her skills after one quarter of employment. Firms that decide to hire meet workers
according to their shares in the market. We rst show that in the Blanchard and
Gali (2008) model, a coe¢ cient on ination larger than one in an interest feedback
for the nominal interest rate guarantees determinacy.
We then show that the introduction of skill loss increases the (positive) e¤ect
of past unemployment on marginal costs. An increase in past unemployment rates
increases the share of the longer-term unemployed and thus worsens the quality of
the pool of job seekers. If the quarterly skill-loss percentage is increased to or above
a critical level, the combined positive e¤ects of lagged and lead unemployment ex-
ceed the negative e¤ect of current unemployment. In such a scenario, if the central
bank responds only to ination, determinacy requires a coe¢ cient on ination in the
feedback rule smaller than one. This holds regardless of whether the central bank
responds to current, lagged or expected future ination.
We also show that the critical skill loss percentage is much lower, and a lot more
plausible, if the ow characteristics of the labour market are "Continental European"
(Blanchard and Gali (2008)) in the sense that there is little hiring and ring going on.
By contrast, under and an "American" calibration of inow and outow rates, the
implied critical skill loss percentage is implausibly high. This is largely due to the fact
that even in the original Blanchard and Gali model lagged and lead unemployment
matter a lot more for marginal costs under the continental European than under the
American calibration.
Furthermore, neither interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap
(as commonly modelled in the New Keynesian literature) help to restore determinacy
under the continental European calibration if skill loss is above its critical level. As
empirical estimates of interest-feedback rules frequently nd that the Federal Reserve
and Bundesbank as well as the ECB respond more than one-for-one to ination, this
might mean that indeterminacy and thus sunspot-driven dynamics are a much more
likely phenomena in continental Europe than in the United States. By contrast, a
modest response to unemployment guarantees determinacy for the full range of skill-
decay percentages and ination coe¢ cients in the interest feedback rule we consider.
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Finally, we compute the response of the model under the European calibration
with skill loss above its critical level and the coe¢ cient on ination larger than one in
the interest-feedback rule to an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse non-correlated
technology shock. It turns out that the response of unemployment is extremely persis-
tent. Thus this admittedly quite stylised model potentially contributes to explaining
the persistent increase in unemployment observed in continental Europe since the
late 1970s, and also the high degree of endogenous persistence in European unem-
ployment. It also suggests the following story: The shift of monetary policy away
from a "Keynesian" approach towards aggressive ination targeting might have been
unproblematic in the uid labour market of the United States but might have been a
source of instability and persistent unemployment uctuations in Western continental
Europe with its much less uid labour market.
9 Appendix I: Determinacy in the Blanchard/ Gali
model
We show in this section that, for reasonable calibrations, the condition stated in
proposition one ensures determinacy in the Blanchard Gali model. Woodford (2003)
derives conditions for determinacy for a linear rational expectations model of the form
Etzt+1
xt+1

= A

zt
xt

+ bet
where A =
0BB@
1+
F 
c0
+F =c0
0+F
c1+u c0
c0
+F =c0
  L+
c1
c0
+F =c0 +1
F+c0
 (c1 c0+u)+0
F+c0
c1 L
F+c0
0 1 0
1CCA ; b =
0B@
 F a
c0
+
+F =c0 (1 a) F =c0+
F+c0
0
1CA
where zt is a 2x1 vector of endogenous jump variables, xt is single endogenous pre-
determined variable and et is a vector of disturbances. This is exactly the kind of
system we are dealing with. The rational expectations equilibrium will be determi-
nate if and only if the matrix A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle, i.e.
with modulus smaller than 1 and the two other eigenvalues outside the unit circle. If
the characteristic equation is written in the form
3 + A2
2 + A1+ A0 = 0
Woodford shows that it will have two roots outside and one root inside the unit circle
if and only if
either (Case I)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 < 0 and
 1 + A2   A1 + A0 > 0
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or (Case II)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0
 1 + A2   A1 + A0 < 0
A20   A0A2 + A1   1 > 0
or (Case III) the rst two conditions of Case II and
A20   A0A2 + A1   1 < 0
jA2j > 3
As would be expected, some of the resulting expressions will be quite complicated
functions of the deep parameters. We therefore do not aspire to give a completely
general proof. Rather, we will make the assumption throughout that g is a very small
number. g = Bx, and B will be calibrated to such that the fraction of total hiring
costs in GDP Bx does not exceed a small fraction of GDP (Blanchard and Gali
set them equal to 1% of GDP for the "American" and even less for the continental
European calibration). In Blanchard and Gali, it comes out as 0.03. This also implies
that 1 < 0, and both c1 and 1 will be small. Furthermore, we will assume that F 
L > 0, which will be the case if F L =Mg (1 )1 u



[1  x  ] +  [1 + 0]

> 0
. This condition holds for values of x and associated values of  which are not too
small. For the calibration considered in this paper, F   L > 0 for x  0:015
and  = 0:0017; both of which is far below empirically reasonable values for these
parameters.
Our rst task is to derive the characteristic equation. To make the algebra easier,
we rst write our matrix A in a more general form:
A =
0BB@
1+
F 
c0
+F =c0
0+F
c1+u c0
c0
+F =c0
  L+
c1
c0
+F =c0 +1
F+c0
 (c1 c0+u)+0
F+c0
c1 L
F+c0
0 1 0
1CCA =
0@ a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
0 1 0
1A
The characteristic equation is then given by
3 + ( a11   a22)2 + ( a23 + a11a22   a12a21)+ a11a23   a21a13 = 0
Hence we can determine A2; A1 and A0 as
A2 =  a11   a22 =  c0 (1 + )  F   0 +  (c1 + u)
F + c0
A1 =
  (1 + ) c1 + L + c0   u + 0
F + c0
A0 =
c1   L
F + c0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We rst look at the second condition of Case I. We have
 1 + A2   A1 + A0 > 0
implying
2
1  u
(1   0) (1 + )
0 + L + F
  1 > 
or
2
1  u
(g (1  ) (1 +  (1  x)) + g (1 + )  1) (1 + )
0 + L + F
  1 > 
This condition will never be fullled by positive values of  under the assumptions
made.
Thus we conclude that Case 1 is not relevant and turn to Case 2. The rst
condition implies
   u
(1  )
0   L   F > 1 (27)
The second condition is implied by the fact that the second condition of Case 1 is
violated, while the third condition implies
 [ L [F   L]  c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L] + Lu] (28)
+c1

1   + c0
 
1  2  F + [L + c0 (1  )  F   u] [F + c0] > 0
Not that if F < L; this expression will be monotonously increasing in : Hence
in that case, if (28)) holds for  = 1; it will hold for  > 1 as well. Hence we set
 = 1 and u = 1(since permissible, i.e. negative values of u make (28)) more likely
to be met), which allows us to write the condition as
0 (F   L) + c0 [0   L   F ] + L (L   c1) + c1 (1  )
+c0c1
 
1  2+ c20 (1  )  + c0F (1  ) + c0L   2F   c1F > 0
This will usually be fullled. Given that c0 slightly larger than 1 and that L and
F are in the same order of magnitude but smaller than 1, and c1 is quite small,
c0L > 
2
F + c1F .
If we assume F L > 0; there is still an issue of (28) being violated for su¢ ciently
large values of  since 
2
 has a negative coe¢ cient. We will now show that under
the assumptions already made, if A20  A0A2 +A1   1 > 0 becomes violated, we will
already be in a situation where jA2j > 3 and thus Case III kicks in. Let us rst
consider the terms in (28) not involving : Those can be written as
c1

1   + c0
 
1  2+F [L   c1]+F c0 (1  )+c0L 2F+c20 (1  ) c0F > 0:
The term 2F is dominated by c0L under the assumptions already made and all the
other terms but  c0F are positive. It is not clear that  c0F is being dominated
by any of the other terms. Therefore, in the next step, we disregard all the other
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terms not involving  except for  c0F : If the modied condition is fullled, so
will be (28) :Hence we look for which  we have (still for u = 0)
 2L [F   L] +  [ c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]]  c0F > 0
or
2  
[ c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]]
L [F   L]  +
c0F
L [F   L] < 0
The polynomial on the left hand side has two solutions 1 and 2 and the inequality
will be fullled if  lies between. Hence we have
1;2 =
 c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]
2L [F   L]

s
( c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L])2
42L [F   L]2
  c0F
L [F   L]
Since we now assume F > L; the expression under the root will always be posi-
tive, as will the expression outside of the root. This also implies that we can focus
on the larger of the two solution since
r
( c1L+c0[0 L]+0[F L])2
42L[F L]2
  c0F
L[F L] >
 c1L+c0[0 L]+0[F L]
2L[F L] and thus the smaller solution will be will be negative. Hence
the relevant lower bound is (27) The larger of the two roots will be at least as big
as the term outside the brackets. Hence condition (28) will still be met under the
assumptions made if
 <
 c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]
2L [F   L] (29)
We now turn to condition jA2j > 3 from Case III to see what it implies for . For
the "large" values of  which are of interest here, A2 will most likely be negative, so
we consider the inequality  A2 > 3; which can be written as
 >
 c0 + 2c0   0 + c1
F
+ 3 (30)
We would like to check whether at the point (29) becomes violated (30) is already
met. Hence we are asking whether
 c1L + c0 [0   L] + 0 [F   L]
2L [F   L] >
 c0 + 2c0   0 + c1
F
+ 3
holds. This can be written as
 c1LF + c0 [0   L]F + 0 [F   L]F
 2c0L [F   L] + 4c0L [F   L]
 20L [F   L] + c12L [F   L] + 6LF [F   L] > 0
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or
 c1LF + c0 [0   L]F + 2c0LF   2c02L   4c0LF
+4c0
2
L + [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )
 c12L [F   L] > 0
or
 c1LF + c0F [0   L   L] + L (2c0L   c0F )
+2c0FL   2c02L   2c0LF + 2c02L
+ [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )  c12L [F   L] > 0
or
 c1LF + c0 [0   L]F + 2c0LF   2c02L   4c0LF + 4c02L
+ [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )  c12L [F   L] > 0
Note also that
2c0FL   2c02L   2c0LF + 2c02L   c1LF   c12L [F   L]
= 2Lc0 (1  ) [F   L]  c1LF   c12L [F   L]
=  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF
Thus we can write
c0F [0   L   L] + c0L (2L   F )
+ [F   L] (0F + 2L0   6LF )  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF > 0
Since (using 0 > F + L) 0F + 2L0   6LF > (F   L)2   L (F   L) =
(F   L) (F   2L)we can write
F c0 (0   L   L) + c0L (2L   F )+
[F   L]2 (F   2L)  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF > 0
The rst term is clearly positive. The second term will be positive as long as
F < 2L. If F   L increases, in that case the rst term would increase and
at a larger rate as both (0   L   L) and F would increase. In this case we
would also see the third term switch from negative to positive, which would oth-
erwise also be negative. The nal two terms are negative. We believe it is safe
to assume that this condition holds. For values of L and F which are close,
F c0 (0   L   L) + c0L (2L   F ) will be in a higher order of magnitude
than [F   L]2 (F   2L)  2L [F   L] [c1   c0 (1  )]  c1LF : For values of
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F substantially higher than L; the order of magnitude of F c0 (0   L   L) will
increase and [F   L]2 (F   2L) would turn positive. Thus the second condition
of case III will be satised for values of  violating (28) :
Thus we have shown, under the assumptions made, that    u (1 )0 L F > 1
guarantees the existence of a unique rational expectations equilibrium in the Blan-
chard/ Gali model.
10 Appendix II: Relevant steady state values in
the model with skill Loss
As was mentioned in the text, we start by assuming values for u and x: This allows
to write the steady state values of ; si; AL and AA as
 =
ux
(1  u) (1  x)
si = x (1  x)i
AL =
1X
i=0
siis =
x
1  (1  x) s
and
AA = sNAL +
 
1  sNt

= AL + 1  
This allows to back out  by rst noting that in the steady state, we can write (11)
as
AL

1
M
  g (1   (1  ))

+ (1  )

1  AL
M

= 0

 (1  ) + W
0
(1   (1  ))

From (7), we have
W = 0
1X
i=0
sii(1 )s = 
0 x
1  (1  x) 1 s
(31)
and, for WL
WL =
1X
i=0
sii(1 )s =
x
1  (1  x) 1 s
which we use to solve for 0 as
0 =
1=M   g (1  (1  ) ) + (1 )
M
 
1  AL
(1  )  + x
1 (1 x)1 s (1  (1  ) )
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11 Appendix III: Deriving the Laws of Motion forbaLt and bwLt
A log linear approximation to the skill level ALt is given by
baLt =
1P
i=0
dsit
i
s
AL
(32)
The shares of the various groups of the unemployed are given by
sit =
Nt 1 i
i

j=1
(1  xt i)
Ut
This can be log-linearised as
dsit = s
i
"bnt 1 i   bUt + iX
j=1
 x
1  xbxt j
#
Log linear approximations to xt and Ut are given by bxt j = bnt j (1 )(1 x)bnt 1 j andbUt =   (1 )x bnt yields
dsit = s
i
"bnt 1 i + 1  

xbnt 1   iX
j=1
 x
1  x
bnt j   (1  ) (1  x) bnt 1 j

#
= si
"bnt 1 i + 1  

xbnt 1   x
1  x
"
iX
j=1
bnt j

  (1  ) (1  x)

iX
j=1
bnt j 1

##
= si
2664bnt 1 i + 1   xbnt 1   x1  x
2664
iP
j=2
bnt j

+ bnt 1

  (1 )(1 x)

iP
j=2
bnt j

  (1 )(1 x)

bnt j 1
3775
3775
= si
264 bnt 1 i
h
1 + x(1 )

i
+ 1 

xbnt 1   x1 x bnt 1
  x
1 x

1

  (1 )(1 x)

 iP
j=2
bnt j

375
= si
264 bnt 1 i
h
1 + x(1 )

i
  x
1 x

1

  (1 )(1 x)

 bnt 1
  x
1 x

1

  (1 )(1 x)

 iP
j=2
bnt j

375
= si
"bnt 1 i 1 + x (1  )


 

x2
 (1  x) + x
 iX
j=1
bnt j

#
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We now use  = ux
(1 x)(1 u) and (1  ) = 1 u x(1 x)(1 u) to eliminate  in the 1 + (1 )x
and x
2
(1 x) + x: This yields
1 + x
(1  )

= 1 + x
(1  u  x)
(1  x) (1  u)
(1  x) (1  u)
ux
= 1 +
1  u  x
u
=
1  x
u
x2
 (1  x) + x =
x2
ux
(1 x)(1 u) (1  x)
+ x =
x
u
(1  u) + x = x
u
Hence we can write
dsit = s
i
"
 x
u
iX
j=1
bnt j + 1  x
u
bnt 1 i# (33)
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Substituting this into (32) yields
baLt =
1P
i=0
iss
i
"
 x
u
iP
j=1
bnt j + 1 xu bnt 1 i
#
AL
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u
1X
i=0
iX
j=1
iss
ibnt j#
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u
1X
q=1
qss
q
qX
j=1
bnt j#
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u
1X
q=1
qss
q (bnt 1 + bnt 2 + bnt 3:::+ bnt q)#
=
1
AL
"
1  x
u
1X
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i   x
u

1ss
1bnt 1 + 2ss2 (bnt 1 + bnt 2) + 3ss3 (bnt 1 + bnt 2 + bnt 3) ::::::
#
=
1
AL
2664

1 x
u
1P
i=0
iss
ibnt 1 i
 x
u
 1P
q=1
qss
q
bnt 1 +  1P
q=2
qss
q
bnt 2 +  1P
q=3
qss
q
bnt 3 +  1P
q=4
qss
q
bnt 4:::
3775
=
1
AL
24 1 xu

s0bnt 1 + 1ss1bnt 2 + 2ss2bnt 3 + 3ss3bnt 4::::::
 x
u
 1P
q=1
qss
q
bnt 1 +  1P
q=2
qss
q
bnt 2 +  1P
q=3
qss
q
bnt 3 +  1P
q=4
qss
q
bnt 4:::
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=
1
AL
2664

s0 1 x
u
  x
u
 1P
q=1
qss
q
 bnt 1 + s1 1 xu   xu  1P
q=2
qss
q
 bnt 2
+

s2 1 x
u
  x
u
 1P
q=3
qss
q
 bnt 3 + s3 1 xu   xu  1P
q=4
qss
q
 bnt 4
3775
=
1
AL
1X
i=1
""
i 1s s
i 11  x
u
  x
u
 1X
q=i
qss
q
!#bnt i#
Using AL =
1P
i=0
siis =
x
1 (1 x)s and s
i = x (1  x)i we can write
 
1P
q=i
qss
q
!
=
x
1P
q=i
qs (1  x)q = is (1  x)i x
1P
q=0
qs (1  x)q = is (1  x)iAL and thus arrive at
baLt = xu
1X
i=1
""
i 1s (1  x)i
AL
  is (1  x)
# bnt i#
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This can be rewritten as
baLt = 1X
i=1
1
u
(1  x)i  i 1s   is bnt i
=
1X
i=1
ani bnt i; ani = 1u (1  x)i  i 1s   is
Thus in the presence of skill loss (s < 1), the deviation of the average skill level from
its steady state depends positively on a weighted sum of past employment rates. The
ani coe¢ cient depend on s and thus 
s :
#ani
#s
=  1
u
(1  x)i  (i  1) i 2s   ii 1s 
For s = 1 (
s = 0); this is clearly positive. Thus the larger the quarterly skill decay
among the unemployed, the larger is the e¤ect of past employment on the skill level.
For s < 1; we have
#ani
#s
R 0, i Q 1
1  s
Hence the e¤ect of s on ani will become negative if i is su¢ ciently large. Furthermore,
#ani
#x
< 0 if s < 1:
To express the component of the real wage depending on the skill of the worker
as a function of past employment rates, we follow an analogous process. A log linear
approximation to WLt is given by
bwLt =
1P
i=0
dsit
i(1 )
s
WL
Note that the only di¤erence to (32) is that s and A
L are replaced by (1 )s and
WL; respectively. Substituting (33) and going through exactly the same process as
before thus gives us
bwLt = 1X
i=1
wni bnt i; wni = 1u (1  x)i (1 )(i 1)s   (1 )is 
and, as with the ani coe¢ cients,
@wni
@s
=  1
u
(1  x)i (1  )

(i  1) (1 )(i 1) 1s   i(1 )i 1s

@wni
@s
> 0 , s = 0
@wni
@s
R 0, i Q 1
1  s
@wni
@x
< 0 i¤ s < 1:
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Furthermore, we have @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
if s = 0 and  > 0:
We now turn to express baLt and bwLt as a function of their t-1 values and past
employment. For baLt we have
baLt = 1u (1  x) (1  s) bnt 1 + 1u
1X
i=2
(1  x)i  i 1s   is bnt i
=
1
u
(1  x) (1  s) bnt 1 + 1u
1X
i=1
(1  x)i+1  is   i+1s  bnt i
=
1
u
(1  x) (1  s) bnt 1 + s (1  x) 1u
1X
i=1
(1  x)i  i 1s   is bnt i
and thus baLt = (1  x)1u (1  s) bnt 1 + sbaLt 1

(34)
Correspondingly for bwLt we have
bwLt = (1  x)1u  1  1 s  bnt 1 + 1 s bwLt 1

(35)
12 Appendix IV: On the relative size of the ani
and wni ,
@ani
@s and
@wni
@s if s > 0
In the following we assume s > 0, s < 1:
We have ani > w
n
i if
 
i 1s   is

>

(1 )(i 1)s   (1 )is

or
i <
ln (1  s)  ln (s   s)
  ln s
Note that for this expression is always positive (as it should be).Thus ani will turn
smaller than wni for large enough i.
The relative size @a
n
i
@s
and @w
n
i
@s
also depends on i. We have
@ani
#s
R @w
n
i
@s
, (1  ) (1 )i 1s
 
(i  1)  1s   i

R i 1s
 
(i  1)  1s   i

Two cases have to be considered: (i  1)  1s   i (i  1)  1s   i Q 0 , i Q 11 s :
If (i  1)  1s   i (i  1)  1s   i < 0, this implies @a
n
i
@s
R @w
n
i
@s
if
1


ln (1  )
ln s
  1

R i
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Now given that we look at the case i < 1
1 s ; we ask whether
1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

> i is
implied by that assumption. Thus we ask whether
1


ln (1  )
ln s
  1

>
1
1  s
This is not necessarily fullled but will be met for the range of s used in this paper
if  > 0:38: Thus if this hold, for i < 1
1 s ; we have
@ani
@s
>
@wni
@s
:
If (i  1)  1s   i (i  1)  1s   i > 0; we have @a
n
i
@s
R @w
n
i
@s
if
1


ln (1  )
ln s
  1

Q i
As for the calibration considered here, with i = 1
1 s we have
1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

> i,
this means that as i becomes equal to 1
1 s ; we have
@ani
@s
<
@wni
@s
:However, it is also
clear that as i increase, we will have i > 1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

and hence @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
: Thus,
for the minimum value of s considered here  > 0:38; we have three di¤erent cases
depending on the value of i: For su¢ ciently low values of i, we have @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
.
There is then an intermediate range where 1
1 s < i <
1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

where we have
@ani
@s
<
@wni
@s
: Finally, for i > 1


ln(1 )
lns
  1

; we have again @a
n
i
@s
>
@wni
@s
:
Since the relative size of ani and w
n
i as well as the e¤ect of an increase in 
s on them
depends on i, it is interesting to look how the combined e¤ect of past employment on
the skill level instead to look at the "net" impact of an increase in past employment
on the real wage and the skill level and how this impact is a¤ected by s: The sum
of the ani and w
n
i is given by
an =
1X
i=1
ani =
1  x
u
1  s
1  (1  x) s
wn =
1X
i=1
wni =
1  x
u
1  1 s
1  (1  x) 1 s
Thus an > wn if 1 s
1 (1 x)s >
1 1 s
1 (1 x)1 s or
 > 0
Hence the combined e¤ect of an increase in past employment on the average skill level
is always higher than the impact on the real wage if there is some real wage rigidity.
Turning towards @a
n
@s
and @w
n
@s
; we have
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This then gives
@an
@s
=
1  x
u
x
(1  (1  x) s)2
> 0
@wn
@s
=
1  x
u
(1  ) x
 
s 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 > 0
Thus the combined e¤ect of past employment on the skill level of the average job
seeker and the average real wage increases in s Furthermore, for some real wage
rigidity ( > 0) and values of s not too much smaller than one,
#an
#s
> #w
n
#s
:
Concerning the e¤ect of a change in x; we have
@an
@x
=  1
u
1  s
(1  (1  x) s)2
< 0
@wn
@x
=  1
u
1  1 s 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 < 0
We have @a
n
@x
< @w
n
@x
if
2x s + 
1 2
s + 1 + 
2 
s > 2x+ 
2(1 )
s + s + 
 
s
Comparing each of the terms on the left and right hand side, we see that for  > 0;
all terms on the left hand side are greater than corresponding term on the right hand
side except for 2 s , which is smaller than 
 
s :The di¤erence between the two will
grow as s declines and thus at some point the inequality would be violated. However,
it can be checked numerically that for the calibrations employed in this paper the
condition is easily fullled.
13 Appendix V: Derivation of the marginal Cost
Equation and the Output Equation in the model
with Skill Loss
This appendix derives the Phillips Curve and the remaining linearised model equa-
tions. Linearising (11) yields
cmct =   (1 Mg)baPt   (1 Mg)baLt + MALW bwt +Mgbxt (36)
  (1  ) Et
"
X (bct   bct+1) + 1 ALAL  cmct+1 + h1 ALAL   (1 )MAL +MgibaPt+1
  (1 Mg)baLt+1 + MALW bwt+1 +Mgbxt+1
#
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with X = gM + 1 A
L M(0 W )
AL
and g = Bx: From (7) and (8), we see that the
average wage can be written up to rst order as
bwt = (1  )baPt + bwLt (37)
where bwLt = (1  x)1u  1  1 s  bnt 1 + 1 s bwLt 1

(38)
Using (37) on (36) gives
cmct =   (1 Mg)  baLt    (1  )EtbaLt+1+ MALW  bwLt   (1  ) Et bwLt+1(39)
 0baPt    (1  ) 1  (1  )0MAL   0

EtbaPt+1 +Mgbxt
  (1  )Et

X (bct   bct+1) + 1  AL
AL
 cmct+1 +Mgbxt+1
0 = 1  gM   (1  ) M
AL
W
Linearising (14) yields
bct = AA
AA   ALgbaAt   AgAA   ALg  baLt + baPt + 00bnt + 01bnt 1 (40)
with 
0
0 =
AL(1 g(1+))
AA Ag and 
0
1 =
(1 )((1+(1 x))ALg+(1 AL))
AA ALg Linearising (12) yields
baAt = ALAA baLt + baPt  
 
1  AL (1  )
AA
(bnt   bnt 1) (41)
Substituting this into (40) yields
bct = baPt + cLbaLt + 00bnt + 01bnt 1 (42)
cL =
AL (1  g)
AA   ALg
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Substituting (42) into (39) yields
cmct = aL1baLt + aL2EtbaLt+1 + MALW  bwLt    (1  )Et bwLt+1  p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1 +Mgbxt
+ (1  )

X


0
0   
0
1
 bnt +X00Etbnt+1    (1  ) 01bnt 1   1  ALAL
 cmct+1  Mgbxt+1
aL1 = 1  gM +  (1  )
AL (1  g)
AA   Ag X
aL2 =  (1  )

1  gM + A
L (1  g)
AA   Ag X

p0 = 
0 +  (1  )X
p1 =  (1  ) M (
0  W )
AL
Using bxt = bnt (1 )(1 x)bnt 1 then yields
cmct =  aL1baLt + aL2EtbaLt+1 + wL1 bwLt   wL2Et bwLt+1   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1
+h
0
0bnt + h0Lbnt 1 + h0FEtbnt+1   hcEtcmct+1
hc =  (1  )
 
1  AL
AL
h0F =   (1  )

gM

  00X

h
0
0 =

gM

 
1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)+  (1  )01   00X
h0L =  

gM


(1  ) (1  x)   (1  ) 01X
We now substitute (34) and (35) ; which, after rearranging, yields
cmct =    aL1   aL2 (1  x) sbaLt +  wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s  bwLt
 
"
h
0
0 + (1  x)
 
aL2
(1  s)
u
  wL2
 
1  1 s

u
!#bnt
+h
0
Lbnt 1 + h0FEtbnt+1   hcEtcmct+1   p0baPt   p1EtbaPt+1
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Using bnt =  but1 u then yields
cmct =  abaLt + w bwLt   0but + Lbut 1 + FEtbut+1   hcEtcmct+1    (p0 + ap1)baPt
a = 
 
aL1   aL2 (1  x) s

w = 
 
wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s

0 = 
"
h
0
0 + (1  x)
 
aL2
(1  s)
u
  wL2
 
1  1 s

u
!#
L =
 h0L
1  u ; 

F =
 h0F
1  u
The equation for output including hiring costs is derived as follows. We have
Yt = A
A
t Nt. Linearising gives byt = baAt + bnt which, using (41) can be written as
byt = baPt + 1AA ALbaLt + ALbnt +  1  AL (1  ) bnt 1
Using bnt =  but1 u gives the equation used in the text.
14 Appendix VI Proof of Propositions on signs of
@
@s
and @
2
@s@x
Marginal cost is given by
cmct =  hcEtcmct+1+FEtbut+1 0but+L1but 1 abaLt +w bwLt  p0baPt  p1EtbaPt+1
If all variables stay constant over time and ignoring technology, we have
cmc =  

0   F   L1   a (1 s)(1 x)u(1 u)(1 (1 x)s) + w
 (1 
1 
s )(1 x)
u(1 u)(1 (1 x)1 s )

1 + hc
bu
=  
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F +
(1 x)
u24 aL2 (1  s)  wL2  1  1 s    aL1   aL2 (1  x) s (1 s)(1 (1 x)s)
+
 
wL1   wL2 (1  x) 1 s
 (1 1 s )
(1 (1 x)1 s )
35
(1 + hc) (1  u) bu
=  
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F +
(1 x)
u
(1  s) a
L
2 (1 (1 x)s) aL1+aL2 (1 x)s
(1 (1 x)s) +
 
1  1 s
  wL2 (1 (1 x)1 s )+wL1  wL2 (1 x)1 s
(1 (1 x)1 s )

(1 + hc) (1  u) bu
=  
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F +
(1 x)
u

 (1 s)(aL1 aL2 )
(1 (1 x)s) +
(1 1 s )(wL1  wL2 )
(1 (1 x)1 s )

(1 + hc) (1  u) bu
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We can express h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F =
gM


1 +  (1  )2 (1  x)  (1  ) (1  x)   (1  )
Using  = ux
(1 x)(1 u) and (1  ) = 1 u x(1 x)(1 u) ; this can be rewritten as
h
0
0 + h
0
L + h
0
F =
gM (1  x) (1  u)
ux
"
1 + 
(1  u  x)2
(1  x) (1  u)2  
1  u  x
(1  u)   
1  u  x
(1  x) (1  u)
#
=
gM
ux
"
(1  x) (1  u) +  (1  u  x)
2
(1  u)   (1  x) (1  u  x)   (1  u  x)
#
=
gM
ux

x (1  x) +  (1  u  x) (1  u  x)  (1  u)
1  u

=
gM
ux

x (1  x)   (1  u  x) x
1  u

=
MBx
u (1  u) [(1  u  x) (1  ) + ux] > 0
due to the restrictions on the parameters. Furthermore, we have aL1 aL2 = (1 BxM) [1   (1  )]
and wL1   wL2 = MALW [1   (1  )] : Hence we can now write:
cmc =  
MB0x
(1 u) [(1  u  x) (1  ) + ux]
+ (1  x) [1   (1  )]

 (1 s)(1 BxM)
(1 (1 x)s) +
(1 1 s )WM
AL
(1 (1 x)1 s )

u (1 + hc) (1  u) bu
=  bu
 =
24 MBx(1 u) [(1  u  x) (1  ) + ux] +
(1  x) [1   (1  )]

 (1 s)(1 B0xM)
(1 (1 x)s) +
(1 1 s )WM
AL(1 (1 x)1 s )
 35
u (1 + hc) (1  u) 
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We will now show that @
@s
> 0 and thus #
#s
< 0 if s is not too far away from 1. A
more general proof seems impossible. We have
@
@s
=
  @hc
@s
 (1 + hc)
(1 + hc)
2
+
 (1  x)
u (1  u)
26666666664
[1   (1  )]
(1 + hc)
26666666664
(1 B0xM)[(1 (1 x)s) (1 s)(1 x)]
(1 (1 x)s)2
+Mh
  s (1  )W +
 
1  1 s

#W
#s
i
AL
 
1  (1  x) 1 s

   1  1 s W
"
#AL
#s
 
1  (1  x) 1 s

 AL (1  x) (1  )  s
#
(AL(1 (1 x)1 s ))2
37777777775
37777777775
It is easily shown that @hc
@s
=   (1  ) @AL
@s
1
(AL)2
< 0: For  > 0; this implies that
  @hc
@s
(1+hc)
(1+hc)
2 > 0: Furthermore, since the range of values of s are those for which  is
positive, or "just" negative, we can safely write #
#s
> 0 if
(1 B0xM)x
(1  (1  x) s)2
+MALW
h
  s (1  ) +
 
1  1 s

#W
#s
1
W
i  
1  (1  x) 1 s

   1  1 s W h#AL#s 1AL  1  (1  x) 1 s   (1  x) (1  )  s i 
AL
 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 > 0
Further simplifying this yields
(1 BxM)x
(1  (1  x) s)2
+
MW
h
 x (1  )  s +
 
1  (1  x) 1 s
  
1  1 s
 
#W
#s
1
W
  #AL
#s
1
AL
i
AL
 
1  (1  x) 1 s
2 > 0
Using W = 0WL,
We now set s = 1: This givesW = 
0 = 1
M
 g [1   (1  )] and,  1  1 s  = 0
and
 
1  (1  x) 1 s

= x, means that our inequality becomes
(1 B0xM)   1
M
 B0x [1   (1  )]M (1  )
x
> 0
Or
 >
B0xM (1  )
1 B0xM (1   (1  ))
This is easily fullled under the calibrations considered in this paper.
For the case of s = 1; we now show that
@2
@s@x
< 0 if  is close to one (as we
assume in the paper) and the other parameters have a calibration of "reasonable"
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magnitude. This means that the e¤ect of the skill level on  is weakened if the
labour market becomes more uid. For s = 1 and  = 1 we have (noting that
@hc
@s
=  (1 u x)
(1 u)x
@
@s
= 
 (1  u  x)
(1  u)x +

u (1  u)2
"
[(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii #
= A1 + A2 where
A1 = 
 (1  u  x)
(1  u)x =
MB0
(1  u)3 u

(1  )  1  2u  2x+ u2 + 2ux+ x2+ ux  ux2   u2x
A2 =

u (1  u)2
"
[(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB0
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii #
Di¤erentiating this with respect to x gives
@2
@s@x
=
@A1
@x
+
@A2
@x
@A1
@x
=
MB0
(1  u)3 u [ 2 (1  ) (1  u  x) + u (1  2x  u)]
@A2
@x
=

u (1  u)2
2664
( + u  1)
h
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )
h
1
x
 MB0
h
(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)(1 u)
iii
+ [(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]h
 B0Mx (1 B0Mx)
x2
  (1  )
h
 1
x2
  MB0
(1 u)
h
(u+ 1)(1 x)+(1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)
(1 x)2
iii
3775
=

u (1  u)2
24 ( + u  1) h (1 B0xM)x   (1  ) h 1x  MB0 h (1 )(1 u)+x(u+ 1)(1 x)(1 u) iii
+ [(1  x  u) (1  ) + ux]
h
 1
x2
  (1  )
h
 1
x2
  MB0u
(1 u)(1 x)2
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Note that
(1 B0xM)
x
  (1  )

1
x
 MB0

(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)
(1  x) (1  u)

=
(  B0xM)
x
+ (1  )MB0

(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)
(1  x) (1  u)

=
(  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u) + x (1  )MB0 [(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)]
x (1  x) (1  u)
and that
 1
x2
  (1  )
 1
x2
  MB
0u
(1  u) (1  x)2

=   
x2
+
(1  )MBu
(1  u) (1  x)2
=
  (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MBu
x2 (1  u) (1  x)2
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Thus
@A2
@x
=

u (1  u)2
264 (+u 1)x(1 x)(1 u)

(  BxM) (1  x) (1  u)
+x (1  )MB0 [(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)]

+
h
(1 x u)(1 )+ux
x2(1 u)(1 x)2
   (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0ui
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We can then write
@2
@s@x
=
@A1
@x
+
@A2
@x
=

u (1  u)3
2666664
MB0 [ 2 (1  ) (1  u  x) + u (1  2x  u)]
+ (+u 1)
x(1 x)
(  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u)
+x (1  )MB0 [(1  ) (1  u) + x (u+    1)]

+
h
(1 x u)(1 )+ux
x2(1 x)2
   (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0ui
3777775
As can be easily checked, setting  = 1 makes @
2
@s@x
more positive. Thus if @
2
@s@x
< 0
for  = 1; then @
2
@s@x
< 0 for  < 1 as well. Hence @
2
@s@x
< 0 if
MBu (1  2x  u) + u [(  B
0xM) (1  x) (1  u) + x2 (1  )MB0u]
x (1  x)
+
u
   (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0u
x (1  x)2 < 0
MB0 (1  2x  u)x (1  x)2 + (  B0xM) (1  x) (1  u) + x2 (1  )MB0u (1  x)
  (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0u < 0
MB0 (1  2x  u)x (1  x)2 + (  B0xM) (1  x)2 (1  u) + x2 (1  )MB0u (1  x)
  (1  u) (1  x)2 + x2 (1  )MB0u < 0
MB0 (1  2x  u)x (1  x)2  MBx (1  x)2 (1  u)
+x2 (1  )MB0u (1  x) + x2 (1  )MB0u < 0
(1  2x  u) (1  x)2   (1  x)2 (1  u) + x (1  )u (1  x) + x (1  )u < 0
 2x (1  x)2 + x (1  )u (1  x) + x (1  )u < 0
 2 (1  x)2 + (1  )u (1  x) + (1  )u < 0
 2  x2   2x+ 1+ (1  )u (1  x) + u (1  ) < 0
 2x2 + 4x  2 + (1  )u  x (1  )u+ u (1  ) < 0
 2x2 + x (4  (1  )u) + 2u (1  )  2 < 0
x2   x (4  (1  )u)
2
  u (1  ) + 1 > 0
The polynomial on the left hands side has two solutions and the inequality will hold
for values of x to the left of the smaller solution or to the right of the larger one. We
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have
x1;2 =
4  (1  )u
q
(1  )2 u2 + 8u (1  )
4
Since the root will be larger than (1  )u; we have x1 > 1; which is outside the
permissible range for x: For x2; we have
x2 =
4  (1  )u 
q
(1  )2 u2 + 8u (1  )
4
Clearly x2 increases in : Thus the larger , the larger is the maximum value of x
consistent with @
2
@s@x
< 0: Setting  = 0; we have
x2 =
4  u pu2 + 8u
4
Thus for x < x2 = 4 u 
p
u2+8u
4
; which is easily fullled for the range of parameters
we consider in this paper; we have @
2
@s@x
< 0 and thus @
2
@s@x
> 0:
15 Appendix VII: Model equations as required by
Sims (2000) Code
We rst use the interest feedback rule to substitute bit out of the Euler equation (not
the policy rule employed here is bit = t + ubut). We can then write the system in
the form
 0yt =  1yt 1 +

	 
  "t
vt

+et
with yt =
266666666666666666666664
xt
xut
xmct
xnt
xctbaPt
tbutcmc0tbuntbctbaLtbwLtbit
377777777777777777777775
;  0 = [ 
1
0  
2
0]
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 10 =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 0 0 0 0 0
0  F hc 0 0  (p0 + ap1)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0  1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 1 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 F 0   (p0 + ap1)
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